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CDA 230 FOR A SMART INTERNET 
Madeline Byrd* & Katherine J. Strandburg** 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 19961 (“CDA 230”), 
which provides broad-based immunity to online service providers for third-
party content, has been hailed as “the law that gave us the modern internet.”2  
Indeed some have gone so far as to suggest that it is responsible for more 
value creation than any other law in U.S. history.3  The breadth of its 
application has come under increasing fire, however, from critics who 
contend that it has turned the internet into a lawless realm that is inundated 
with false and misleading information and often hostile to women and 
minorities.4 
 
*  J.D., 2019, New York University School of Law. 
**  Alfred B. Engelberg Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Information Law 
Institute, New York University School of Law.  Professor Strandburg is grateful for summer 
research funding from the Filomen D. Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund.  This 
Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Rise of the Machines:  Artificial Intelligence, 
Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the 
Neuroscience and Law Center on February 15, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law.  
For an overview of the Symposium, see Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword:  
Rise of the Machines:  Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019). 
 
 1. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., Derek Khanna, The Law That Gave Us the Modern Internet—and the 
Campaign to Kill It, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/09/the-law-that-gave-us-the-modern-internet-and-the-campaign-to-kill-
it/279588 [https://perma.cc/3FNB-2UJ3]. 
 3. David Post, A Bit of Internet History, or How Two Members of Congress Helped 
Create a Trillion or so Dollars of Value, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/27/a-bit-of-internet-
history-or-how-two-members-of-congress-helped-create-a-trillion-or-so-dollars-of-value 
[https://perma.cc/HP54-S9M3]. 
 4. For critiques of CDA 230 and proposals for reform, see, for example, Danielle Keats 
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage:  Revising Section 230 Immunity, 
2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453 (2018) and Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet 
Will Not Break:  Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404–
06 (2017) [hereinafter Internet Will Not Break] and Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, 
From the Digital to the Physical:  Federal Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 
56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 142, 142 (2019) (arguing that the CDA “has been stretched beyond 
recognition to prevent all manner of prudent regulation” and proposing a variety of possible 
approaches to reform).  For an excellent, sympathetic overview of the provision, see Eric 
Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3306737 [https://perma.cc/UWH7-6PHE]. 
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This Article analyzes CDA 230 liability in light of the evolution of smart 
services employing data-driven personalized models of user behavior.  As an 
illustrative case study, we discuss discrimination claims against Facebook’s 
ad-targeting platform, relying on recent empirical studies5 and litigation 
documents for factual background.6 
We argue that current controversies about CDA 230’s scope are best 
analyzed within a larger context of debates about secondary liability regimes.  
Viewing CDA 230 through this lens, we propose reforms that account for the 
growing predominance of smart services and provide pathways for dealing 
with other areas of concern. 
Part I provides background on CDA 230, taxonomizing the primary strains 
of the case law in a secondary liability frame.  Part II describes aspects of 
Facebook’s ad-targeting platform that are salient for our analysis.  Part III 
outlines the basics of discriminatory advertising law under the Fair Housing 
Act7 (FHA) and considers potential liability for two types of audience 
selection tools.  Part IV analyzes CDA 230’s applicability to those audience 
selection tools.  Part V analyzes CDA 230 from a secondary liability 
perspective.  This Article concludes with proposals for modifying CDA 230 
in light of the preceding analysis. 
I.  CDA 230 IMMUNITY:  HOPES AND STRUGGLES 
Section 230(c) of the CDA, entitled “Protection for Good Samaritan 
Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material,” grants providers and users 
of “interactive computer services” sweeping exemption from liability for 
actionable content created or published by others.8  Its central provision 
states:  “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”9  This Part briefly reviews CDA 230’s history 
and judicial interpretation and explains how the evolution of the doctrine 
touches upon themes common to secondary liability regimes. 
 
 5. See Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization:  How Facebook’s 
Ad Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes (Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.02095.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L47-YLA8]; see also Amit Datta et 
al., Discrimination in Online Advertising:  A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 81 PROC. MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. 20 (2018); Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted 
Advertising, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 5 (2018). 
 6. See generally Settlement Agreement and Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019), ECF No. 67-2 [hereinafter Settlement 
Agreement]; Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., No. 
1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018), ECF No. 48 [hereinafter HUD Brief]. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
 8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 9. Id. 
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A.  CDA 230’s History and Purpose 
Congress enacted CDA 230 in 1996, during the early years of the internet’s 
transformation into a hub of commercial and social activity.  Its enactment 
responded to a judicial ruling that Prodigy, which hosted a large set of online 
“bulletin boards,” could be liable as the “publisher” of defamatory user 
postings.10  As evidence that Prodigy was a publisher, rather than merely a 
distributor, of user postings, the ruling relied heavily on Prodigy’s 
employment of content moderators, promulgation of content guidelines, and 
use of software to filter out offensive language.11 
Congress, as explained in the statutory “Findings” and “Policy,”12 was 
concerned about the downstream effects of holding service providers liable 
for users’ defamation simply because they attempted to screen out 
unwelcome content.13  Traditional publisher-style screening for actionable 
content would have been untenable for online services that provided forums 
for user-driven exchanges involving large amounts of rapidly changing 
content.14  Congress also anticipated that, if relieved of liability, online 
service providers would develop innovative technological “fixes” to the 
content-screening problem.15  Given these assumptions, the benefits of 
publisher liability seemed far outweighed by the costs. 
Today, the hope that automated filtering technology could effectively 
screen user content for actionable defamation, harassment, and the like seems 
naive.  CDA 230’s drafters also seem to have vastly underestimated the harm 
side of the equation and undoubtedly would have been horrified by the 
tsunami of racist, sexist, homophobic, fraudulent, untruthful, and otherwise 
hurtful discourse that has accompanied the internet’s benefits. 
The evolution from hands-off user forums to smart services has led to an 
interesting jujitsu.  While Congress originally feared that online service 
providers would respond to liability risk by giving up trying to filter out 
“objectionable” content, proponents of strong CDA 230 immunity now fear 
that service providers will engage in overly cautious “collateral 
 
 10. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 230, 110 Stat. 133, 137; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-
Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and 
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted 
access to objectionable material.”). 
 11. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. 
 12. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2012). 
 13. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 86. 
 14. Internet Will Not Break, supra note 4, at 404–06 (discussing the background to CDA 
230 and noting Prodigy’s argument that “it could not possibly edit the thousands of daily 
messages posted to its bulletin boards as a traditional publisher would”). 
 15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (listing policy objectives including “to encourage the development 
of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received” and “to 
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material”). 
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censorship.”16  Bolstering this fear, large online service providers have 
responded to calls for regulation by constructing extensive regimens 
combining filtering with human review, which raises freedom of expression 
concerns.17 
B.  Judicial Interpretation and CDA 230’s Broad Sweep 
CDA 230 immunizes any defendant who is “treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”18  Because CDA 230 does not define “publisher,” its interpretation 
has been a central, and difficult, task for the courts.  Plaintiffs initially 
responded to CDA 230 defenses by arguing that the provision preserves 
defamation doctrine’s distinction between “publishers,” who are held 
responsible if they negligently publish defamatory content, and 
“distributors,” who are liable only if they receive notice and do not act.19  
Early cases rejected this distinction, however, immunizing service providers 
against both “publisher” and “distributor” liability20 and giving them free 
rein in handling requests to take down allegedly actionable content.21 
These early cases were harbingers of broad judicial interpretation of 
“publisher” under CDA 230.  Many cases have tested the scope of 
“publisher” activities, with results holding, for example, that CDA 230 
immunizes decisions about what to post; nonsubstantive editing; 
reformatting of fonts, colors, and the like; and re-presentation of information 
in the form of star ratings or maps.22 
 
 16. See generally Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary 
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011); James Grimmelmann, To Err Is Platform, 
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/ 
err-platform [https://perma.cc/52C7-TJGL]. 
 17. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors:  The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635 (2018). 
 18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).  The reference to “speakers” is essentially redundant 
and has played little role in CDA 230’s interpretation. 
 19. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–50 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 20. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52. 
 21. For a particularly expansive, and controversial, ruling that CDA 230 applies even to 
takedown injunctions issued after users have been held liable, see generally Hassell v. Bird, 
420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). 
 22. See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1269–71 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding CDA immunity even where Google put the advertisements into a 
map format); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA 
immunity even where Yelp! took reviews from a different website and added a star rating); 
O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA immunity even 
where Google had performed some “automated editorial acts on the content, such as removing 
spaces and altering font” and “kept the search result up even after [the plaintiff] complained 
about it”); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“The CDA expressly bars ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise 
of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330)). 
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Courts also have interpreted CDA 230’s substantive range of applicability 
broadly,23 except in a few arenas where it was explicitly limited.24  While 
scholars and policymakers have proposed removing CDA 230 protections 
from additional substantive categories,25 only the recent Allow States and 
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 201726 (FOSTA) has been 
enacted thus far. 
Though refusing to recognize broad substantive exceptions to CDA 230’s 
coverage, courts have sometimes declined to extend CDA 230 protection 
because particular claims did not treat the defendant as a “publisher.”  For 
example, courts have denied immunity from claims of failure to provide 
warnings required by state law,27 violations of federal robocalling 
regulations,28 failure to follow regulations applicable to rental agents,29 
failure to collect city amusement tax,30 and failure to post ads after accepting 
payment.31  Consistent with this approach, courts have emphasized that CDA 
230 does not provide blanket protection to a service provider who “plays 
 
 23. See, e.g., Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) (state torts including 
negligence, deceptive business practices and false advertising, intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation); Chi. 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 
2008) (Fair Housing Act); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(“material support” for terrorism); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act); Hassell, 420 P.3d 776 (enforcement of a takedown 
injunction); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. 2012) (unfair or deceptive trade 
practices). 
 24. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012) (limiting immunity for claims involving federal criminal 
law, intellectual property law, and electronic surveillance law). 
 25. See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations:  Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1320–21 (2017); Press Release, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., NAAG Supports Amendment to the Communications Decency 
Act (May 23, 2019), https://www.naag.org/naag/media/naag-news/naag-supports-
amendment-to-the-communications-decency-act.php [https://perma.cc/728T-PLB6] 
(suggesting an exception for state criminal violations); Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory 
Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Apr. 1, 2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data [https://perma.cc/ 
8H5G-732C] (suggesting “an explicit exception to Section 230 immunity for violations of 
civil rights laws”). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 47 
U.S.C.). 
 27. See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850–52 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying 
immunity in a failure to warn case where particular third parties used the defendant’s website 
to target and lure rape victims). 
 28. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Montes, 378 F. Supp. 3d 741, 750 (W.D. Wis. 2019) 
(denying immunity in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim based on robocalling). 
 29. See, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682–84 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (denying immunity in a case involving rental regulations). 
 30. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “Chicago’s amusement tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a 
‘speaker’” and thus “Section 230(c) is irrelevant”). 
 31. See, e.g., O’Hara-Harmon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-00601 WHA, 2019 WL 
1994087, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2019) (“Facebook would likely not be immunized from a 
claim alleging it charged and collected money to publish advertising that it then did not 
publish.”). 
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multiple related but distinct roles in the online platform it has established.”32  
For example, where Airbnb acted as both “a publisher of third-party rental 
listings” and “an agent that books rental agreements between users and hosts 
and collects and distributes payments,” it was not immune from regulations 
“directed only at Airbnb’s conduct in the latter role.”33 
Faced with the broad judicial interpretation of “publisher,” plaintiffs often 
contend that a service provider is liable because it acted as an “information 
content provider” in its own right.  CDA 230 defines “information content 
provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.”34  Courts have routinely treated 
service providers as potentially liable “information content providers” when 
they or their employees independently created or developed actionable 
content.35  At the other end of the spectrum, courts have generally granted 
CDA 230 protection to defendants when plaintiffs alleged merely that a 
provider knew that a service was being used for illegal purposes or profited 
from a third party’s creation and publication of actionable content.36 
In intermediate cases, the crux of the issue is whether various activities 
amount to “development” of information content “in part.”37  Though CDA 
230 doctrine has not drawn a bright line, it is useful to consider two lines of 
argument which, foreshadowing our analysis in Part V, we can analogize to 
separate threads of secondary liability.38  One argument, analogous to 
“contributory liability,” contends that the design or structure of a service 
contributes to the information content’s alleged illegality, thereby making the 
provider partly responsible for its development.39  A second argument, 
analogous to “inducement,” contends that a provider is partly responsible for 
development when it actively encourages users to develop actionable 
content.40  Courts have generally been unconvinced by inducement-type 
 
 32. HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 683–84; Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, No. 18-12358-
LTS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74823, at *11–12 (D. Mass. May 3, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-
1561 (1st Cir. June 6, 2019); see also Airbnb, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 217 
F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1072–73 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 33. Airbnb, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74823, at *11–12. 
 34. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
 35. See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016); FTC v. LeadClick 
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
 36. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 
2007); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 727 (Wis. 2019). 
 37. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–68 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 38. See infra Part V; see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (relating CDA 230 to contributory copyright 
infringement). 
 39. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670. 
 40. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (“The CDA does not grant immunity for 
inducing third parties to express illegal preferences.”); see also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421 (leaving 
open the question of whether CDA 230 would immunize the “‘clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster’ unlawful activity that would be necessary to find active 
inducement” (quoting MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005))). 
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arguments.  Disagreement about the implications of inducement seems to 
underlie disparate decisions about whether Backpage.com could rely on 
CDA 230 immunity with respect to claims involving its hosting of ads for 
prostitution.41 
Courts have more often held providers responsible for developing 
actionable information based on the designs of their services.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley 
v. Roommates.com, LLC42 is the seminal case in this regard.  That decision 
held that CDA 230 did not exempt Roommates.com from FHA liability when 
its website “ma[de] answering the discriminatory questions a condition of 
doing business” and its search system was designed to “steer users based on 
the preferences and personal characteristics that Roommate.com itself forces 
subscribers to disclose,” thus making it “more difficult or impossible for 
individuals with certain protected characteristics to find housing—something 
the law prohibits.”43  Roommates.com was, however, immune from liability 
for allegations concerning posts that users entered into a box designed to 
collect open-ended comments.44 
The majority contrasted services designed as neutral tools that can be used 
for both illegal and legal purposes with services that make material 
contributions to the illegality.45  Thus, a standard search engine is a neutral 
tool protected by CDA 230 even if its algorithm sometimes puts a defamatory 
post at the top of search results.46  It is also not enough, under this test, to 
show that a service could have been designed to be less amenable to 
actionable use.47 
As of this writing, we are unaware of any judicial opinion interpreting how 
CDA 230 applies when “smart” algorithms play a role in the illegality 
associated with online information content.  The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), however, has expressed its view in litigation 
that CDA 230 does not immunize Facebook from liability for discriminatory 
housing ad targeting, a question we analyze in Part IV.48 
 
 41. See J. S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015) 
(finding that CDA immunity would not apply where Backpage.com’s “content requirements 
are specifically designed to control the nature and context of those advertisements so that 
pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex, including the trafficking of 
children”); see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(finding that CDA immunity did apply to Backpage.com).  Similar claims would now be 
viable under FOSTA. 
 42. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 43. Id. at 1166–67. 
 44. Id. at 1173–74. 
 45. Id. at 1167–68. 
 46. See O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 47. See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Wis. 2019). 
 48. HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 14–17. 
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II.  FACEBOOK’S AD-TARGETING PLATFORM 
A.  Overview 
Facebook supports itself by selling advertising that is targeted using the 
vast amounts of personal information it gleans from users’ account 
information, friend networks, posts and activities on the Facebook site itself, 
information about other online activities that Facebook obtains about some 
users through various tracking mechanisms, and offline data sources.49  
Facebook sells advertising through a sophisticated online platform that can 
be used by advertisers, large and small, to target ads to prospective 
customers.50  Our description is a snapshot intended as a springboard for our 
analysis, rather than a representation of the current status of Facebook’s ad 
platform, which is modified often.  It is based on the recent empirical work 
of Muhammad Ali and Till Speicher.51  Before and subsequent to these 
empirical studies, for example, Facebook changed the platform in response 
to press reports and claims made in litigation.52  More major modifications 
are in the works as part of a 2019 settlement agreement and will be discussed 
below.53 
The process by which a particular ad is placed before a particular user has 
a number of steps.54  First, advertisers supply the content for the ads, choose 
from among several approaches for selecting a target audience, and provide 
information about their advertising budgets and goals.55  Second, ads are 
eventually placed using an auction algorithm which considers advertisers’ 
objectives and advertising budgets,56 along with “estimated action rates” and 
“ad quality and relevance.”57  Facebook’s algorithms for ad targeting and 
placement are, of course, proprietary.58 
B.  Audience Selection Approaches 
Facebook offers advertisers several approaches to audience selection.  
Here we focus on its two “smart” approaches:  attribute-based targeting and 
 
 49. See generally Ali et al., supra note 5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id.; see also Datta et al., supra note 5; Speicher et al., supra note 5; Julia Angwin 
et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA 
(Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-
discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/UY3V-4923]. 
 52. See, e.g., Sheryl Sandberg, Doing More to Protect Against Discrimination in Housing, 
Employment and Credit Advertising, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/protecting-against-discrimination-in-ads 
[https://perma.cc/9P3A-9KHD]. 
 53. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 54. Ali et al., supra note 5. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See generally id. 
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“lookalike audience” targeting.  Empirical studies demonstrate that each can, 
at least in principle, result in biased targeting.59 
1.  Attribute-Based Targeting 
Facebook’s attribute-based audience selection permits advertisers to select 
audiences based on thousands of attributes which Facebook creates based on 
information gleaned from its users’ activities.  While some of these 
“attributes” are based straightforwardly on Facebook users’ self-
identification in their “profiles,” most are defined and constructed by 
Facebook based on data-driven analysis of users’ activities.60  Facebook 
offers a menu of attributes divided into categories:  demographics, interests, 
and behaviors.61  Users can also search for and employ hundreds of thousands 
of additional “free-form” attributes.62  As of the time of this writing, the 
demographic menu, for example, includes categories such as education, 
finances, life events, parents, relationships, and work, which can be drilled 
down to more specific attributes such as education level or schools 
attended.63  Most of these attributes can be used both to include and to 
exclude users.64 
The menu for behavioral attributes includes a very large number of 
categories, perhaps the most interesting of which is “multicultural affinity.”  
According to Facebook, this category is not based on a user’s ethnic identity 
but, rather, “represents how interested the user is in content related to 
different ethnic communities.”65  Originally called “ethnic affinity,” it was 
renamed and removed from the list of possible exclusions after a ProPublica 
article exposed that “ethnic affinity” could be used to exclude particular 
ethnic groups from targeted audiences.66  Options for “multicultural affinity” 
include “African-American, Asian-American, Hispanic-All, Hispanic-
English Dominant, Hispanic-Spanish Dominant, [and] Hispanic-
Bilingual.”67 
While certain attributes, such as multicultural affinity, age, gender, or 
religion, are either protected characteristics or obviously close proxies, there 
 
 59. See generally Datta et al., supra note 5; Speicher et al., supra note 5; Ali et al., supra 
note 5; Angwin et al., supra note 51. 
 60. Speicher et al., supra note 5, at 11 (“It is unclear how exactly Facebook infers these 
attributes, but from their own description this information can be gathered in many different 
ways such as user activity on Facebook pages, apps and services, check-ins with Facebook, 
and accesses to external webpages that use Facebook ad technologies.”). 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. at 11–12. 
 63. See generally id.; Help Your Ads Find the People Who Will Love Your Business, 
FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting [https://perma.cc/ 
QYT5-69TX] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 64. See Speicher et al., supra note 5, at 7. 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Jeremy B. Merrill, What We Learned from Collecting 100,000 Targeted Facebook 
Ads, PROPUBLICA:  ELECTIONLAND (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/facebook-political-ad-collector-targeted-ads-what-we-learned [https://perma.cc/ 
S8YC-Y2MZ]. 
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are also less obvious attributes or combinations of attributes that function as 
reasonably close proxies for such protected characteristics.68 
2.  Lookalike Audience 
To use the lookalike audience approach, an advertiser provides Facebook 
with a base audience list and Facebook’s algorithms create an expanded 
audience of “similar” people.69  While it is not obvious that demographic 
similarity is generally relevant to creating promising audiences for targeted 
ads, Speicher has demonstrated that Facebook’s lookalike audiences tend to 
reproduce demographic disparity in the base audience.70 
3.  Changes Required by the 2019 Consent Decree 
A class action lawsuit filed by the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) 
against Facebook settled with a consent decree issued in March 2019.71  
Among other changes, the consent decree requires Facebook to limit the 
ways in which the tools outlined above can be used for targeting housing, 
employment, or credit (HEC) ads.72  On or before September 30, 2019, 
Facebook will implement a tool called HEC Flow, which will modify the 
audience selection tools in four ways.73  First, targeting by zip code will no 
longer be an option.  Instead, geographic targeting will have to encompass at 
least a fifteen-mile radius from the center of a chosen city or address.74  
Second, age and gender will no longer be available as targeting criteria for 
those categories of ads.75  Third, Facebook promises that “[n]o targeting 
options that Facebook determines are direct descriptors of, or semantically 
or conceptually related to, a person or group of people based on Protected 
Classes will be available” for targeting HEC ads.76  The consent decree 
defines “direct descriptors” as “targeting options whose names directly 
describe persons in Protected Classes” and defines “semantically or 
conceptually related to” as “targeting options whose names appear to be 
associated with a Protected [Class].”77 
Fourth, the consent decree specifies that the lookalike audiences algorithm 
can use data from the country, region, profession, and field of study of a user 
 
 68. For example, Speicher found that facially neutral attributes, such as “U.S. Politics:  
Very Liberal” and “Interest:  Online games,” were disproportionately correlated with 
Facebook profiles belonging to Black Facebook users, while facially neutral attributes such as 
“U.S. Politics:  Very Conservative” and “Interest:  Hiking” were disproportionately correlated 
with Facebook profiles belonging to White Facebook users. Speicher et al., supra note 5, at 
12. 
 69. Id. at 15. 
 70. Id. at 15–18. 
 71. Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 1. 
 72. Id. at 3–4. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. Exhibit A, at 3. 
 77. Id. 
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profile but may not consider “age, gender, relationship status, religious 
views, school, political views, interested in, or zip code.”78  The lookalike 
audiences tool may, however, continue to use all data about user behavior on 
the site (such as ad engagement, apps, or pages), with the exception of 
Facebook groups.79  The decree further requires Facebook to rename the tool 
so that it does not “refer to finding users who ‘look like’ users provided by 
advertisers.”80  It also requires that Facebook provide a “Housing Search 
Portal,” such that users will be able to search all housing ads posted on 
Facebook, regardless of whether they are in the targeted audience.81 
III.  HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY AND AUTOMATED AD-
TARGETING PLATFORMS 
In some contexts, such as housing, employment, and credit, U.S. laws 
prohibit private party discrimination, including discriminatory advertising, 
based on “protected” attributes, which commonly include race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, age, and disability.  Our case study focuses on 
discriminatory housing advertising, which is prohibited under the Fair 
Housing Act.  Part III.A explains the FHA’s standards for determining 
whether actionable discriminatory advertising has occurred and who can be 
held liable for actionable discrimination, highlighting unsettled questions 
about the standard that would apply to disparate ad targeting.  Part III.B then 
considers whether and how an ad-targeting platform such as Facebook might 
be held liable for discrimination resulting from attribute-based or lookalike 
audience ad targeting. In this Part, we set aside the question of CDA 230 
protection, which is addressed in Part V. 
A.  Discriminatory Ad Targeting Under the Fair Housing Act 
The FHA makes it unlawful: 
to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any 
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or 
an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.82 
We divide our discussion of potential liability into two inquiries.  First, has 
actionable discrimination occurred under the FHA?  Second, if so, who is 
liable? 
1.  Has Actionable Discrimination Occurred? 
Discriminatory housing advertising claims are generally evaluated based 
on whether an “ordinary reader” of the ad would have perceived an unlawful 
 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
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“preference, limitation, or discrimination.”83  The FHA’s “ordinary reader” 
standard stands out from other discrimination standards under the FHA and 
elsewhere because the defendant’s intentions, purposes, or reasons are 
largely irrelevant under the standard, which has been characterized as a 
“strict liability” provision.84  Although most of the case law under these 
provisions involves advertising content, discriminatory ad targeting is also 
actionable according to regulations promulgated by HUD, which is 
responsible for enforcing the FHA. 
Under the regulations, discriminatory advertising includes “[s]electing 
media or locations for advertising the sale or rental of dwellings which deny 
particular segments of the housing market information about housing 
opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin.”85  The regulations also prohibit “limiting information, by 
word or conduct, regarding suitably priced dwellings available for 
inspection, sale or rental, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin.”86 
Former HUD guidelines provide the following further examples of 
actionable selective advertising: 
[T]he use of English language media alone or the exclusive use of media 
catering to the majority population in an area, when, in such area, there are 
also available non-English language or other minority media, may have 
discriminatory impact. . . .  The following are examples of the selective use 
of advertisements which may be discriminatory: 
(a) Selective geographic advertisements.  Such selective use may 
involve the strategic placement of billboards; brochure advertisements 
distributed within a limited geographic area by hand or in the mail; 
advertising in particular geographic coverage editions of major 
metropolitan newspapers or in newspapers of limited circulation which are 
mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular segment of the 
community; or displays or announcements available only in selected sales 
offices.87 
Since the effects of discriminatory targeting are the same whether it is 
accomplished by selective use of particular media or by automated targeting, 
it is unsurprising that HUD has taken the position that the FHA’s 
discriminatory advertising prohibitions reach such automated targeting.88 
 
 83. See, e.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(Ragin II); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (Ragin I). 
 84. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, A Social Norm Theory of Regulating Housing Speech 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 84 MO. L. REV. 435, 441–45 (2019). 
 85. 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(3) (2019). 
 86. 24 C.F.R. § 100.80(b)(4) (2019). 
 87. 24 C.F.R. § 109.25 (1995) (withdrawn from the C.F.R by Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity; Regulatory Reinvention; Streamlining of 
HUD’s Regulations Implementing the Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,378 (Apr. 1, 1996) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 100, 103, and 109)). 
 88. See HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 23–24; HUD v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-
0323-8, at 1–2 (Charge of Discrimination Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/ 
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There are, as yet, no judicial opinions that apply the FHA to automated 
behavioral ad targeting and it remains unclear what standard courts should 
apply to assess whether disparate ad targeting is discriminatory under the 
FHA.  HUD invoked the ordinary reader standard in a recent brief in the 
Facebook advertising litigation, but neither that brief nor the few judicial 
opinions touching on more traditional ad targeting provide much explanation 
of how the ordinary reader standard should be applied.89 
Traditionally, the ordinary reader standard turns on readers’ likely 
perceptions of the content of the ad, regardless of advertisers’ intentions.90  
Discriminatory ad targeting cannot be assessed on the basis of ad content, 
however, which begs the question of what the ordinary reader would look at 
to judge whether actionable discrimination has occurred.  One possible 
approach would consider whether the demographic makeup of the ultimate 
target audience would indicate a prohibited “preference, limitation, or 
discrimination” to an ordinary reader.91  This first approach seems in tune 
with the ordinary reader standard’s broad remedial approach but raises 
questions about whether an ordinary reader has a reasonable basis for judging 
ad audience demographics. An alternative approach might instead consider 
the ordinary reader’s perspective on the ad-targeting plan or process.92  This 
second approach also raises questions about the competence of ordinary 
readers, particularly where complicated automated targeting tools are used.  
In addition, it might belie the purpose of the ordinary reader standard by 
lacking sensitivity to the targeting’s real-world impact on potential 
customers. 
Given that discriminatory ad targeting may have little or nothing to do with 
how readers perceive ad content, courts might instead set aside the ordinary 
reader approach in favor of the disparate treatment or impact approaches 
applied to other aspects of housing discrimination.93  Under these theories, a 
burden-shifting approach is applied.  Plaintiffs must first prove a prima facie 
case showing either that they were treated differently based on a protected 
characteristic or that a practice (here, ad targeting) disparately impacted a 
protected class.94  The defendant may then either rebut the prima facie case 
 
sites/dfiles/FHEO/documents/HUD%20v%20Facebook%20-%20Charge.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BT8Q-M6RX] [hereinafter HUD Charge]. 
 89. See HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 90. See, e.g., Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 396, 407 
(S.D. Ohio 2011). 
 91. Id. at 406 (quoting Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006)). 
 92. Id. at 411 (“In cases like this, where the ads in question are part of a large advertising 
campaign, but are not facially discriminatory, courts have found it appropriate to look at the 
entire advertising campaign to help determine whether there is an FHA violation.”). 
 93. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2518–26 (2015). 
 94. Id. at 2523.  For an overview of these approaches and a discussion of how they might 
apply to data-driven models, see Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 694–712 (2016).  Note that HUD has recently issued a 
proposed rule that would heighten the standard under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 for a prima facie 
case based on disparate impact. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate 
Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,858–59 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
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or produce evidence that there was a nondiscriminatory “legitimate reason” 
or “business necessity” for the treatment or practice.95  Plaintiffs may rebut 
the proffered reason by demonstrating that it is pretextual or, in a disparate 
impact analysis, that there is a reasonable, less discriminatory alternative.96  
The outcomes of particular cases will, of course, turn upon which of these 
(or some other) standards courts eventually adopt. 
2.  Who Is Liable? 
24 C.F.R. § 100.7 governs who can be held liable, assuming actionable 
discrimination can be established.97  Direct liability is broadly construed to 
include not only a person’s “own conduct that results in a discriminatory 
housing practice” but also a person’s “fail[ure] to take prompt action to 
correct and end a discriminatory housing practice by a third-party, where the 
person knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and had 
the power to correct it.”98 
Courts have held not only advertisers but also intermediaries, such as 
newspapers and listing services, liable for discriminatory advertising.99  A 
recent opinion considered the potential liability of a tenant-screening service 
 
pt. 100).  The proposed rule also provides standards for defendants to rebut the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case if it alleges that the “cause of a discriminatory effect is a model used by the 
defendant, such as a risk assessment algorithm.” Id. at 42,862.  If adopted as final, the proposed 
rule changes are expected to make it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to prove 
discrimination under a disparate impact theory and to restrict the claims that can be brought 
based on defendants’ use of automated algorithms.  See, e.g., Emily Badger, Who’s to Blame 
When Algorithms Discriminate?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/08/20/upshot/housing-discrimination-algorithms-hud.html [https://perma.cc/T23L-
JE8P]; Lola Fadulu, Trump Proposal Would Raise Bar for Proving Housing Discrimination, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/trump-housing-
discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/XR3K-ENK6].  It appears, however, that the proposed 
rule changes do not have substantial implications for the arguments made in this Article, which 
mostly do not depend on specifics of the disparate impact standard.  In particular, the proposed 
rule changes do not amend either 24 C.F.R. § 100.75, which deals with discriminatory 
advertising, or any of the relevant provisions of 24 C.F.R. § 100.7, which determines who can 
be held liable for discrimination under the FHA.  It is also worth noting that the HUD charge 
against Facebook, which was issued not long before the proposed rule, claims discrimination 
based on both attribute-based and lookalike audience targeting, which suggests that HUD itself 
does not view its proposed rule changes as inconsistent with ad-targeting platform liability 
under the FHA. 
 95. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra 
note 94, at 696, 701. 
 96. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2518. 
 97. The regulation was adopted in 2016, but, according to HUD’s responses to comments, 
“Section 100.7 does not create liability that does not already exist” and “helps clarify the Act’s 
coverage for residents and housing providers.” Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment 
Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act,  
81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,066–67 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).  It 
provides for both direct liability in section (a) and vicarious liability for the actions of an agent 
or employee in section (b).  Here we concern ourselves only with direct liability. 
 98. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2019). 
 99. See, e.g., Ragin I, 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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that provided automated criminal records analyses to landlords.100  While not 
based on discriminatory advertising, this opinion is instructive regarding the 
question of who is directly liable under the FHA.101  The court held that the 
screening service’s own conduct was actionable because “[a]llowing a 
screening company to facilitate discrimination by disqualifying qualified 
applicants on an impermissible basis or by allowing a customer to set 
impermissible qualification standards with impunity would subvert the 
purpose of the FHA.”102  Alternatively, the service could be liable for failing 
to correct the landlord’s discriminatory conduct because it had “held itself 
out as a company with the knowledge and ingenuity to screen housing 
applicants by interpreting criminal records and specifically advertised its 
ability to improve ‘Fair Housing compliance’” and had “a duty not to sell a 
product to a customer which would unwittingly cause its customer to violate 
federal housing law and regulations.”103 
B.  Ad-Targeting Platform Liability Under the FHA 
This section explores how the FHA’s liability standards might apply to 
disparate ad targeting resulting from the use of attribute-based and lookalike 
audience ad-targeting tools. As discussed in Part III.A, the FHA standard for 
discriminatory ad targeting is unsettled and certainly raises interesting 
questions.  Here, however, our exploration of FHA ad-targeting liability is 
aimed at illuminating our understanding of how CDA 230’s breadth affects 
substantive regulation, particularly for “smart” services.  Because CDA 230 
only matters when service providers would otherwise be held liable, the 
discussion generally assumes actionable discrimination has occurred and 
focuses on whether ad-targeting platforms are likely to be liable for that 
discrimination.  It delves into the potential substantive standards only to the 
extent that they have implications for that question. 
This section first considers the possibility that smart platforms such as 
Facebook generally have so much information about how ads are targeted to 
their users that they should essentially always be held liable for failure to 
correct advertisers’ discriminatory ad targeting, regardless of the targeting 
process.  Setting that possibility aside, it then considers the potential for ad-
platform liability under the FHA based on advertisers’ use of attribute-based 
and lookalike audience selection tools. 
1.  Should Smart Platforms Always Be Liable for Failure to Correct? 
As noted above, FHA liability can attach not only for a defendant’s own 
conduct but also for failure to correct discriminatory conduct that the 
defendant knew or should have known about and had the power to correct.104  
 
 100. See generally Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. 
Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 2019). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 372. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra Part III.A. 
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Ad-targeting platforms have complete power over the design of their ad-
placement systems and the eventual placement of ads.105  In this respect, they 
are much like the tenant-screening service held responsible when its 
automated tool produced criminal history evaluations used in a landlord’s 
discriminatory decisions.106  Arguably, a platform’s ultimate control over its 
ad placement system always gives it sufficient “power to correct” 
discriminatory ad targeting,107 even though it does not control the various 
choices its advertisers make when using its audience selection tools.  If so, 
an ad-targeting platform’s liability under the FHA will turn on whether it 
“should have known” about an advertiser’s discriminatory practices.108 
A smart ad-targeting platform, such as Facebook, has extensive 
information about how ads are targeted on its platform:  it knows what 
attributes its advertisers select, can analyze ad content, and has a wealth of 
relevant knowledge about its users, both within and outside of the audience 
that is ultimately targeted.109  Arguably, this data and technical capacity 
mean that a smart ad-targeting platform “should know” whenever any 
targeted audience has a significantly disparate makeup.110  Liability would 
then flow from the platform’s failure to correct the disparity by readjusting 
the audience.  Though this argument for platform liability is perhaps novel in 
the FHA context, it is not as extreme as it might sound.  A smart platform is 
often the only party with either the capacity to detect discriminatory ad 
targeting or the power to correct it.  Moreover, this understanding of the 
“failure to correct” standard would amount, in essence, to imposing a duty 
on ad-targeting platforms that is rather similar to the negligence standard 
applied to traditional publishers. 
Of course, courts may not adopt such a sweeping view of ad-targeting 
platform power and knowledge.  Even so, “failure to correct” liability might 
arise from the features of particular targeting tools, as discussed during the 
evaluation of liability for attribute-based and lookalike audience targeting in 
the next two subsections. 
2.  FHA Liability Arising from Attribute-Based Targeting 
While we are primarily interested in platform liability, we begin by 
discussing advertiser liability, as a point of comparison and a potential basis 
for a platform’s liability for “failure to correct.” 
 
 105. See supra Part II. 
 106. See Corelogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 374. 
 107. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (2019). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See supra Part II.B. 
 110. How to determine what a smart platform “should know” is a fascinating question, 
which we do not consider further in this Article. 
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a.  Advertiser Liability 
Courts would almost certainly hold housing advertisers liable for choosing 
targeting attributes that are direct or reasonably apparent proxies for 
protected characteristics, either under an ordinary reader standard or because 
advertisers would be hard-pressed to come up with legitimate reasons for 
such targeting.  If disparate targeting results from less obviously problematic 
attribute choices, however, the outcome might depend on the substantive 
standard.  We can presume for sake of argument that the disparity in the 
ultimate target audience would indicate a “preference, limitation, or 
discrimination” to an “ordinary reader” or create a prima facie case of 
disparate impact.111  Moreover, a housing advertiser might have considerable 
difficulty providing legitimate reasons for targeting based on attributes that 
bear no apparent relationship to protected characteristics if they also seem 
unrelated to an individual’s likely interest in a particular housing ad or 
suitability as a tenant or purchaser.  Many, if not most, of the attributes that 
Facebook makes available for ad targeting are of this ilk. Under a standard 
based on the ordinary reader’s perception of an advertiser’s targeting plan, 
however, plaintiffs might be much less successful. 
b.  Platform Liability 
For attribute-based targeting, the platform’s “own conduct” entails 
choosing, defining, and computing the attributes its tool offers and making 
them available to housing advertisers.112  In a “but-for” sense, this conduct 
“results in” any actionable targeting that occurs, but such a sweeping 
interpretation is probably beyond the scope of even the FHA’s “strict 
liability” approach to advertising discrimination.  Distinctions can be drawn 
between various types of ad-targeting platform conduct relating to attribute-
based targeting. 
 
 111. Making the prima facie case would be more difficult under HUD’s proposed 
modifications to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, particularly because it requires plaintiffs to state facts 
plausibly alleging that a challenged policy or practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary 
to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective such as a practical business, profit, policy 
consideration, or requirement of law.” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,862 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100).  Arguably, however, our arguments regarding the absence of legitimate 
reasons for targeting housing ads based on certain attributes might also satisfy this 
requirement. 
 112. HUD’s proposed rule for disparate impact claims permits defendants to rebut a prima 
facie case alleging that “the cause of a discriminatory effect is a model used by the defendant, 
such as a risk assessment algorithm” if the defendant  
[p]rovides the material factors that make up the inputs used in the challenged model 
and shows that these factors do not rely in any material part on factors that are 
substitutes or close proxies for protected classes under the Fair Housing Act and that 
the model is predictive of credit risk or other similar valid objective.  
Id.  It is not at all obvious that attribute-based targeting involves the sort of predictive model 
covered by this provision or that allegations involving discriminatory attribute-based targeting 
amount to alleging that such a model is the “cause” of the discriminatory effect. 
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Consider first a platform’s conduct in providing targeting attributes that 
are direct or apparent proxies for protected characteristics.  Facebook has 
argued that, because its attribute-based tool is intended for general-purpose 
advertising, it cannot be liable merely for offering attributes that cannot be 
legally used to target housing ads.113  However, the platform’s own conduct 
extends beyond designing an attribute-based tool that allows advertisers to 
select proxies for protected characteristics.  It includes whether and how the 
platform marketed its attribute-based ad-targeting tool to housing advertisers 
and what, if anything, it does to inform housing advertisers or to prevent or 
discourage them from selecting prohibited targeting attributes.  The totality 
of this conduct might be taken to “result in” discriminatory targeting even if 
merely including proxies for protected attributes in a general-purpose tool 
does not. 
A platform’s own conduct also includes defining, naming, and often 
inferring the attributes it offers.  A platform might thus incur liability if it 
provides attributes that are defined, named, or inferred in a biased way that 
results in discriminatory targeting.  For example, suppose an advertiser 
selects financial attributes that appear to be relevant to whether an ad 
recipient would be able to afford the housing on offer, but the inferences 
made by the platform’s algorithms in assigning those attributes to users were 
systematically inaccurate for certain protected classes.  While the advertiser’s 
selection of those attributes would not appear discriminatory to an ordinary 
reader and would seem justified by legitimate business reasons, the platform 
might well be liable under any standard for constructing the attributes in a 
biased way. 
If a platform successfully argues that its own conduct did not result in 
actionable housing discrimination, might it still be held liable for “failure to 
correct” its advertisers’ attribute selections that resulted in discriminatory 
targeting?  Unless courts adopt the expansive view of platform power and 
knowledge presented in Part III.B.1, it seems unlikely that platforms will be 
deemed to have the requisite power to control advertisers’ attribute 
selections. 
3.  FHA Liability Arising from Lookalike Audience Selection 
The lookalike audience tool shifts the burden of responsibility for audience 
selection almost entirely onto the platform’s shoulders, often leaving it as the 
only potential discriminatory ad-targeting defendant.  As a result, the 
 
 113. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or Alternatively 
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Complaint at 27, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018), ECF No. 40 [hereinafter Facebook 
Brief] (“Facebook—as a website that publishes ads for many different types of goods and 
services, not just housing—is fundamentally different from a multiple-listing service or 
brokers’ organization, which are run by brokers themselves for the sole and express purpose 
of offering and promoting housing opportunities.”). 
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likelihood of platform liability grows, while the likelihood of advertiser 
liability diminishes.114 
a.  Advertiser Liability 
Any advertiser liability for discriminatory targeting resulting from 
lookalike audience selection must arise from disparities in the base audience 
submitted by the advertiser.  Because of the attenuated connection between 
the base audience and the demographics of the lookalike audience, however, 
such grounds for advertiser liability seem relatively weak.  While the base 
audience provided by an advertiser helps determine the lookalike audience 
in a “but-for” sense, a court might—and perhaps should—conclude that it is 
the platform’s similarity algorithm, rather than the advertiser’s “own 
conduct,” that “results in” a disparately targeted lookalike audience.115 
Facebook’s website currently says that a “Lookalike Audience is a way to 
reach new people who are likely to be interested in your business because 
they’re similar to your best existing customers.”116  In light of this promise, 
an ad-targeting plan that simply involves submitting a base audience of 
existing customers is unlikely to be perceived as problematic by an “ordinary 
reader.”  Under a disparate impact analysis, targeting ads to “people who are 
likely to be interested in your business” also provides a seemingly legitimate 
reason for employing the tool.  Facebook’s “similarity” metric is secret, 
leaving advertisers no grounds to anticipate how the base audiences they 
supply will influence the demographics of the lookalike audience.  Indeed, 
based on Facebook’s statement, an advertiser might even hope that the 
lookalike audience tool would expand its target audience to include likely 
customers from currently underrepresented groups.  In sum, advertisers 
neither control nor understand how a lookalike audience selection tool 
depends on the demographics of the base audience.  It thus seems quite 
possible that courts would conclude that advertisers’ base audience 
submissions do not “result in” discriminatory ad targeting that emerges in the 
lookalike audience. 
 
 114. If courts adopt a disparate impact approach to automated ad targeting, HUD’s 
proposed changes to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 seem most likely to affect claims involving lookalike 
audience targeting.  Under the proposed rule, ad-targeting platforms might attempt to rebut a 
prima facie case by demonstrating that their similarity algorithms avoid using attributes that 
are “substitutes or close proxies for protected classes.” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,862.  If courts take the proposed 
rule’s standard seriously, however, rebuttal also requires defendants to demonstrate that their 
algorithm’s version of “similarity” metric is a “valid objective.” Id.  That may be a trickier 
task if the algorithm produces disparately composed lookalike audiences. 
 115. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2019). 
 116. Create a Lookalike Audience, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/ 
help/465262276878947 [https://perma.cc/8EDF-S6RM] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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b.  Platform Liability 
Ad platforms may well be directly liable for discriminatory lookalike 
audience targeting based on their “own conduct” in designing and 
implementing algorithms that “result in” lookalike audience disparities.  
Such a platform might find it awkward to argue that the advertiser’s base 
audience selection is to blame because such an argument would suggest that 
the platform’s lookalike audience tool tracks the base audience’s balance of 
protected characteristics—an assertion platforms would presumably want to 
avoid.  Moreover, a general-purpose tool argument seems unpersuasive when 
applied to a lookalike audience tool that promises to use the platform’s user 
data and algorithm to find promising customers for an advertiser’s business. 
In the unlikely event that a court decides that an advertiser’s submission 
of a disparate base audience resulted in discriminatory targeting while the ad-
targeting platform’s algorithm design did not, plaintiffs would have a 
particularly strong argument for holding the platform liable for “failure to 
correct” the discriminatory targeting.  Whereas the general “failure to 
correct” argument described in Part III.B.1 would define what an ad-targeting 
platform “should have known” by the data available to it, a lookalike 
audience algorithm must actually analyze the attributes of both base and 
lookalike audience members in order to assess similarity.  Moreover, 
Facebook’s promise to create lookalike audiences that are “likely to be 
interested in your business”117 suggests that its lookalike audience algorithm 
analyzes the content of the ad and thus that it “should know” when it is 
dealing with a housing ad. 
4.  Possible Impact of the Consent Decree 
The changes required by the March 2019 consent decree will lower the 
overall chances of an underlying FHA violation in several ways.  Eliminating 
the options to target housing ads by zip code, gender, age, and other attributes 
highly correlated with protected classes makes it less likely that advertisers 
will use Facebook’s tools to discriminate.  Likewise, limiting the factors the 
lookalike audience algorithm considers in assessing similarity may result in 
less disparate results.  It is by no means clear, however, that these changes 
will substantially reduce discriminatory housing ad targeting or protect 
Facebook from future liability.118 
Many unprotected targeting attributes will continue to be available to 
housing advertisers even though they appear to be irrelevant to reasonable 
housing ad targeting.  If selecting such attributes produces disparate 
targeting, advertisers might still have trouble providing legitimate reasons for 
using them and Facebook may not be any more persuasive in articulating 
legitimate reasons for including them as options for housing advertising.  It 
is similarly hard to imagine legitimate reasons, in the housing context, for 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. The changes may be more protective, however, if courts decide to apply a disparate 
impact analysis and HUD’s proposed changes to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 are adopted. 
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relying on many of the attributes that the settlement permits Facebook to 
continue using to create lookalike audiences. 
IV.  CDA 230 IMMUNITY AND AUTOMATED AD TARGETING 
As discussed in Part I.B, aside from making mostly unsuccessful 
arguments for a narrower interpretation of “publisher,” plaintiffs have 
focused on two types of arguments against CDA 230 immunity:  (1) that the 
claims at issue do not treat the defendant as a speaker or publisher; and (2) 
that the service provider is an information content provider responsible for 
the development of actionable content by materially contributing to it (often 
through the design of its services) or inducing it.  This Part considers how 
these arguments are likely to fare against CDA 230 assertions by ad-targeting 
platforms. 
A.  Ad Targeting as a Publisher Activity? 
In general, targeting advertising is quite likely to be considered a 
“publisher” activity under CDA 230.  As Facebook argues in litigation: 
Publishers routinely allow advertisers to target ads and assist them in doing 
so.  For instance, newspapers sell advertising space to sporting goods 
store[s] in the sports section and broadcast networks sell airtime to 
advertisers on different channels during different shows depending on the 
preferred audience.  The publication of ads entails more than displaying 
them; it also entails allowing advertisers the ability to reach their target 
audience.119 
The NFHA counters that while “[a] traditional ‘publisher’ is a website that 
‘reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or 
technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it,’”120 “Facebook’s 
conduct goes far beyond this ‘reviewing’ and ‘editing’”121 and its ad-
targeting service thus is not a “publisher” function under the CDA.122  
Facebook correctly notes, however, that “[c]ourts have consistently held in 
analogous contexts that ad targeting is a traditional publisher function 
protected by the CDA.”123 
While it seems likely that courts would credit Facebook’s argument that 
ad targeting is generally a “publisher” activity, plaintiffs might nonetheless 
argue that CDA 230 does not preclude liability based on a platform’s “failure 
to correct” advertiser discrimination because such claims do not treat the 
 
 119. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 24–25. 
 120. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue or 
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 15, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. 
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2019), ECF No. 49 [hereinafter 
NFHA Reply Brief] (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 25 (first citing Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com 
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016); then citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
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platform as a publisher.  In Espinoza v. County of Orange, a court recently 
denied an employer CDA 230 immunity for claims alleging an employer’s 
“failure to investigate and resolve” discriminatory workplace harassment,124 
where the harassment involved derogatory blog postings made by coworkers 
using work computers.125  The court noted that the “plaintiff is not arguing 
defendant is the publisher of the blog postings” and that the “defendant’s 
breach was not based on its employees’ use of their work computers but on 
its own failure to investigate and resolve the problem.”126  An FHA plaintiff 
could advance a similar argument that liability for “failure to correct” 
discriminatory ad targeting does not treat the ad platform as a publisher. 
Under current CDA 230 precedent, courts are unlikely to be convinced of 
the analogy.  Espinoza alleged that his employer should have resolved the 
harassment by policing its employees’ use of work computers more 
effectively, an action unrelated to publishing.127  Correcting discriminatory 
ad targeting, however, necessarily means either directly modifying the target 
audience or changing how it is selected, actions that seem quite similar to the 
steps that a conventional publisher would take to avoid publishing 
discriminatory ads. 
Courts are thus likely to conclude that ad targeting is at least generally a 
“publisher” activity and to reject plaintiffs’ arguments that “failure to 
correct” claims in particular are beyond the scope of CDA 230.  For the most 
part, then, plaintiffs’ success will depend on whether ad-targeting platforms 
are treated as “information content providers” under CDA 230. 
B.  Ad-Targeting Platforms as Information Content Providers? 
A party engaged in nominally publisher-type activities is not immune 
under CDA 230 to the extent it acts as an “information content provider” 
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through [an] interactive computer service.”128  In the 
NFHA litigation, Facebook argued that it is not an “information content 
provider” of discriminatorily targeted advertising because “[p]laintiffs do 
not, and cannot, allege that Facebook ‘materially contribut[ed] to [the] 
alleged unlawfulness’ of the content or ‘assisted in the development of what 
made the content unlawful.’”129  The NFHA and HUD responded that 
Facebook is an “information content provider” because:  (1) it “seizes upon 
 
 124. Espinoza v. County of Orange, No. G043067, 2012 WL 420149, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Feb. 9, 2012); see also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 
no immunity where an “obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes to the 
content posted by the website’s users”).  But see Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ., 
377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 66 (D. Mass. 2019) (CDA 230 applies even “when a plaintiff claims 
disability discrimination based on a lack of access rather than on the content of speech.”). 
 125. Espinoza, 2012 WL 420149, at *2–3. 
 126. Id. at *9. 
 127. See id. at *8–9. 
 128. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012); see supra Part I.B. 
 129. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 19 (quoting FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 
F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
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benign content posted by its users—not merely sex and location but also 
personal interests, demographic information, and browsing history—to 
actively classify its users into categories” that enable discriminatory ad 
targeting; (2) its “ad utilities . . . invite housing providers to express unlawful 
demographic and other audience preferences,” making “Facebook and the 
advertiser . . . co-developers of each targeted ad”;130 and (3) it develops the 
“information” contained in the attributes offered by its targeting platform.131 
These arguments illustrate the difficulty in applying CDA 230 to 
Facebook’s ad-targeting platform and similar smart services.  Facebook is 
clearly correct that its targeting tools have nothing to do with developing the 
third-party ad content.  While HUD and the NFHA make plausible arguments 
that Facebook is, nonetheless, materially responsible for discriminatory ad 
targeting, they have some difficulty shoehorning this responsibility into CDA 
230’s “information content provider” definition, which naturally focuses on 
contributions to “content.”  These tensions, also reflected in judicial opinions 
grappling with the “information content provider” definition, reflect deep 
issues with the structure and interpretation of CDA 230, which we analyze 
further below. 
For now, we analyze how FHA claims against ad-targeting platforms 
would fare under the CDA 230 test preferred by the plaintiffs in the NFHA 
litigation, which evaluates whether a platform is “responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development” of discriminatory ad targeting, using 
the approach developed in Roommates.com.132  Moreover, whatever the 
eventual scope of “failure to correct” liability under the FHA, only an ad-
targeting platform’s “own conduct” can turn it into an “information content 
provider” that is ineligible for CDA 230 immunity. 
1.  Attribute-Based Audience Selection 
The Roommates.com analysis contrasted “neutral tools” with online 
services that made “material contributions” to third-party actionable conduct.  
In litigation over its ad-targeting tools, Facebook emphasizes that “[a] 
material contribution to the alleged illegality of content [under the CDA] . . . 
means being responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly 
unlawful”133 and contends that it does nothing to require or encourage 
advertisers to select attributes that result in disparate audiences.134  It argues 
further that its “provision of neutral tools that . . . may be used by some 
advertisers for an unlawful purpose falls squarely within the scope of CDA 
immunity.”135 
 
 130. HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 18, 21, 22. 
 131. See NFHA Reply Brief, supra note 120, at 16. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 9, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017), ECF No. 34 (quoting Jones v. Dirty World 
Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
 134. Id. at 19. 
 135. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 2. 
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Plaintiffs, in contrast, argue that Facebook’s active involvement in 
defining, developing, and assigning attributes to users and offering them to 
advertisers materially contributes to discriminatory targeting,136 particularly 
when the available attributes include protected characteristics.137  
Analogizing to Roommates.com, they argue further that “[w]hen a business 
enterprise extracts such information from potential customers [about their 
protected statuses] as a condition of accepting them as clients, . . . the 
enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for developing that information.”138 
These opposing contentions demonstrate that “neutral tools” and “material 
contributions” are not simply two sides of the same coin.  Attribute-based 
targeting is neutral in that it can be used to target housing (and other) 
advertising in either a discriminatory or nondiscriminatory fashion.  
Nonetheless, Facebook’s design and definition of attributes that proxy for 
protected characteristics do contribute materially to the development of any 
discriminatory ad targeting that makes use of them. 
It is hard to predict how a court would come out on this issue.  Given the 
general tendency of courts to favor immunity, Facebook may have the better 
of the argument139 and ad-targeting platforms may ordinarily be shielded 
from liability for discriminatory attribute-based targeting. 
2.  Lookalike Audience 
A platform’s role in designing the algorithm used to create a lookalike 
audience tool undoubtedly contributes materially to whether disparate 
targeting results.  Whether the lookalike audience tool is nonetheless a 
“‘neutral tool[]’ protected by the CDA,”140 as Facebook contends, depends 
on what “neutral” means in this context.  If “neutral” describes a tool that 
was not designed to promote discrimination, lookalike audience targeting 
may be neutral.  If, on the other hand, “neutral” means that the user, not the 
tool designer, controls whether the outcome is discriminatory or 
nondiscriminatory, lookalike audiences targeting is definitely not neutral.  As 
discussed in Part III.B.2.b, while they contribute a “base audience,” 
advertisers have essentially no say whatsoever in whether the lookalike 
audiences used to target their ads are disparately targeted.  While it remains 
unclear how courts will resolve the “neutral tool” question, plaintiffs’ 
arguments against CDA 230 immunity for ad-targeting platforms are 
certainly strongest for the lookalike audience tool. 
 
 136. NFHA Reply Brief, supra note 120, at 16. 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 138. Id. at 10–11. 
 139. See supra Part I.B. 
 140. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 21 (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
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C.  Putting It All Together:  Can Plaintiffs Recover Against Ad-Targeting 
Platforms? 
Putting Parts III and IV together, overall, we would roughly expect that:  
(1) failure to correct claims are likely to fail because of CDA 230 immunity; 
(2) attribute-based targeting claims are somewhat likely to be viable under 
the FHA but reasonably likely to fail nonetheless because of CDA 230; and 
(3) lookalike audience–based claims are the most likely to succeed under 
both the FHA and CDA 230.  If ad-targeting platforms are successful in 
claiming CDA 230 protection, plaintiffs may have no recourse because 
advertisers are unlikely to be held liable. 
V.  SMART SERVICES, SECONDARY LIABILITY, AND CDA 230 
Though not ordinarily framed in these terms, the tensions and trade-offs 
underlying the controversy about CDA 230 immunity are helpfully 
understood by reference to debates about various forms of secondary 
liability.141 
A.  Secondary Liability Paradigms 
Secondary liability often aims to enlist the assistance of large, 
institutionalized, deep-pocketed players in enforcing laws when enforcement 
against those who are directly liable is ineffective or costly.142  It can also be 
intended to rein in the behavior of intermediaries who facilitate the 
underlying illegality or amplify its harms.  Secondary liability routinely 
provokes controversy about who is an appropriate defendant and what level 
of culpability or mental state should be required.  When the boundaries 
between legal and illegal underlying behavior are not bright,143 there is often 
fear that secondary liability defendants, who may have more to lose and more 
litigation risk than direct liability defendants, will overcompensate.  The 
extent to which overcompensation is either likely or problematic depends on 
the context and the type of secondary liability involved.144 
Secondary liability can be divided into four basic types:  (1) what we will 
term “monitor and control” liability, exemplified by vicarious liability for 
those with a right, ability, or duty to control the actions of those directly 
liable; (2) notice-based liability; (3) liability for inducement of a third party’s 
actionable conduct; and (4) contributory liability based on facilitating or 
contributing to actionable conduct.  Secondary liability often requires some 
 
 141. Note that the immunity framework provided by CDA 230 has been referenced in the 
context of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the issues with a safe harbor 
approach to internet service provider (ISP) copyright immunity given the state of the modern 
internet. See, e.g., Katherine Burkhart, Note, Mavrix v. LiveJournal:  Unsafe Harbors in the 
Age of Social Media, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1015, 1029–33 (2018). 
 142. See Wu, supra note 16, at 302–04. 
 143. This is obviously true of speech-related claims but also for claims involving 
intellectual property infringement where there are gray lines between socially beneficial uses 
and infringement. 
 144. See generally Wu, supra note 16; Grimmelmann, supra note 16. 
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level of knowledge or intent; the appropriate level for a given context is 
debatable.  Courts and commentators have grappled extensively with 
secondary liability for online copyright infringement, which is a useful 
comparator here since some (though not all) of the underlying policy issues 
are similar.145 
1.  Publishers, Distributors, and Secondary Liability 
Because defamation doctrine was the mental model underlying CDA 230, 
we use its relationship to secondary liability as a framework for introducing 
secondary liability.  Defamation involves the communication of content that 
is false and harmful to reputation.146  The doctrine distinguishes between 
original speakers, (re-)publishers, and those who “merely [make] available 
to another equipment or facilities that he may use himself for general 
communication purposes.”147 
Original speakers and publishers are ordinarily held liable even if they are 
only negligent,148 meaning they did not act “reasonably in checking on the 
truth or falsity or defamatory character of the communication before 
publishing it.”149  The duty to check varies contextually.  For example, 
professional publishers, such as newspapers, are judged by the “skill and 
experience normally possessed by members of that profession.”150  While 
publisher liability is framed as direct liability, it is effectively a form of 
secondary liability premised on actionable third-party content. 
Publisher liability is one form of “monitor and control” liability.  Like 
vicarious liability, it subjects certain secondary parties to affirmative duties 
to monitor others’ behavior, but the negligence standard makes the duty less 
absolute.  Olivier Sylvain’s suggestion to require online service providers to 
make “good faith” efforts to screen for discrimination is another sort of 
“monitor and control” standard.151  Depending on the stringency of the 
standard and the cost and feasibility of distinguishing actionable from 
permissible third-party behavior,152 “monitor and control” liability can 
incentivize overenforcement, including “collateral censorship.” 
Distributors, such as booksellers and news vendors, are liable only if they 
know or have reason to know specific content is defamatory.153  Distributor 
liability is a form of notice-based liability.  The Digital Millennium 
 
 145. See Grimmelmann, supra note 16. 
 146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59 (AM. LAW INST. 1976). 
 147. Id. § 581 cmt. b.  This terminology can be a bit confusing because the communication 
element of defamation is also called “publication.” Id. § 558.  References to “publisher 
liability,” as well as interpretations of CDA 230’s use of the term, however, connote 
republishers of third-party content. 
 148. For exceptions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 583–612 (AM. LAW INST. 
1976).  Most notably, for statements about public figures, see id. § 580A. 
 149. Id. § 580B cmt. g. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Sylvain, supra note 25. 
 152. Wu, supra note 16; Grimmelmann, supra note 16. 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1976); see id. cmt. b. 
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Copyright Act’s (DMCA) “safe harbor” for online service providers who 
adopt a statutory “notice and takedown” regime provides another example.154  
While notice-based liability relieves secondary parties of monitoring duties, 
it can still incentivize overenforcement, especially when it is difficult or 
costly to evaluate whether a user’s conduct is actionable.155  Service 
providers may then respond by censoring conduct too readily.  Especially in 
the online context, this may incentivize dubious notices, which ratchet up 
service provider costs and create a feedback loop.  As James Grimmelmann 
puts it, while defamation “is a doctrinal swamp where cases often turn on 
subtle nuances of meaning,” copyright seems like a promising context for 
online notice-based liability, since “the prima facie question of whether a 
particular piece of content is or is not a nearly identical copy of a particular 
copyrighted work is something a platform can delegate to a hashing 
algorithm.”156  Nonetheless, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime is 
widely criticized for allowing “take-down” without adequate proof of the 
underlying infringement.157 
The degree to which notice-based liability fosters overenforcement also 
depends on the duties imposed on secondary parties.  A service provider is 
only eligible for the DMCA safe harbor, for example, if it “responds 
expeditiously to remove” allegedly infringing material “upon 
notification.”158  Although users can dispute the takedown later, based on fair 
use and other defenses, the DMCA essentially codifies overenforcement.  
FHA “failure to correct” liability is also a version of notice-based liability, 
given its “knew or should have known” trigger.  Neither the standard nor the 
context invites the knee-jerk overenforcement mandated by the DMCA, 
however.  Because of the variations possible among both notice-based and 
“monitor and control” regimes, and particularly because of the issue of 
dubious notices in the online context, there is no single answer to which sort 
of regime creates greater overenforcement incentives. 
2.  Contributory Liability 
Contributory liability159 attaches to a secondary party who contributes to 
or facilitates another party’s actionable behavior but whose conduct is not 
directly actionable.  To avoid ensnaring innocent behavior, contributory 
liability regimes often exempt providers of general-purpose components, 
equipment, or facilities and impose mental-state standards beyond mere 
 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 155. Amanda Reid, Considering Fair Use:  DMCA’s Take Down & Repeat Infringers 
Policies, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 101, 105 (2019) (“In this haze, ISPs are incentivized to over-
block and err on the side of removing content—including lawful content.”). 
 156. Grimmelmann, supra note 16 (making a similar point about child pornography as 
well). 
 157. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 155, at 123–24. 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 159. The term is sometimes used to refer to both what we call “contributory liability” and 
what we call “inducement.”  We take our terminology from the patent statute, which 
distinguishes them clearly. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012). 
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negligence.  Although defamation doctrine does not incorporate a fully 
realized version of contributory liability, it similarly provides immunity for 
those who merely make “equipment or facilities” available to others for 
“general communication purposes.”160 
Contributory liability standards vary.  Contributory copyright 
infringement, for example, requires proof that the defendant provides a 
technology or service that materially contributes to another’s infringement 
and is not “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”161  Patent law requires 
a showing that the defendant’s technology was “especially made or 
especially adapted for [infringing] use.”162 
Contributory liability is distinguished from both “monitor and control” and 
noticed-based liability in that it does not require secondary parties to do 
anything about others’ actionable conduct except to refrain from contributing 
to it.  The doctrine thus attempts to avoid overenforcement issues.  
Depending on the specific standards for actionable contributions and mental-
state requirements that are adopted,163 different contributory liability regimes 
may create somewhat different balances between overenforcement and harm 
reduction, which reflect different policy trade-offs. 
The exemption for general-purpose services has a more universal 
justification because imposing liability on such a service in one substantive 
arena may create negative externalities in others.  For this reason, it is 
reasonable to include a general-purpose service exemption in any 
contributory liability regime. 
3.  Inducement Liability 
Inducement liability, which is incurred by encouraging others to engage in 
actionable conduct, has no analog under traditional defamation doctrine.  It 
“premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” and 
neither “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses” 
nor incidental acts “such as offering customers technical support or product 
updates” are sufficient.164  Inducement liability is broader than contributory 
liability in some respects because it does not require a material contribution 
to others’ conduct by the platform.165 
 
 160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1976). 
 161. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 162. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 163. In intellectual property law, for example, there have been longstanding debates about 
the contours of the mental state requirements for contributory and inducement liability and 
several Supreme Court decisions address the issue. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (patent infringement); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 
U.S. 754 (2011) (patent infringement); MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) (copyright infringement).  See generally Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement 
from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635 (2008) (situating intellectual property’s 
secondary liability doctrines within tort law). 
 164. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937. 
 165. See id. 
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Inducement liability’s focus on the secondary defendant’s own actions and 
mental state arguably avoids creating overenforcement incentives.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court opined that copyright’s inducement liability “does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful 
promise.”166  That view is probably too rosy.  The fuzziness of inducement 
liability’s boundaries may create some incentive to avoid gray areas.  The 
line between inducing actionable and nonactionable behavior (say, 
defamation or profane criticism) is not always bright.  Proving mental state 
is notoriously difficult.167  Moreover, factfinders might assess the 
defendant’s own statements and the design of its service through the prism 
of its users’ conduct.  The extent to which inducement liability will produce 
risk-averse behavior by service providers depends on the context, as does the 
extent to which society should care. 
B.  CDA 230 Through a Secondary Liability Lens 
CDA 230’s defamation-focused design contained within it the seeds of 
problems that have borne unfortunate fruit, especially as smart services have 
emerged.  Those seeds were of two varieties:  first, CDA 230’s drafters did 
not anticipate the wide variety of conduct and legal claims it could potentially 
immunize; second, CDA 230 adopted defamation doctrine’s all-or-nothing 
approach to secondary liability, ignoring the possibility that the socially 
preferable secondary enforcement regime might depend on the substantive 
context. 
1.  CDA 230 and Service Provider Conduct 
CDA 230 envisions only three roles for online service providers:  
publisher168 of third-party information content, information content provider, 
and, implicitly, general-purpose facility.  Relatedly, CDA 230 reflects an 
assumption that actionable content is the only source of liability for publisher 
activities. 
Online service providers now engage in a broad variety of activities that 
CDA 230 was not designed to handle.  Automated filtering, sorting, and 
prediction have vastly changed the scope of online publishers’ activities, 
which can now create or contribute to liability that is not based on actionable 
content.  CDA 230 holds publishers immune unless they create or develop 
actionable content.169  As a result, the statute now often immunizes 
publishers from liability for their own directly actionable conduct. 
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 167. See generally Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 
(2011) (discussing some of the complexities involved in proving state of mind). 
 168. CDA 230’s reference to a “publisher or speaker” is redundant, since a “speaker” of 
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 169. See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2016); FTC v. LeadClick 
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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Our ad-targeting case study illustrates this problem.  Facebook argues that 
it is immune from liability for creating and offering targeting attributes and 
for its lookalike audience algorithm essentially because they are publisher 
activities that do not contribute to content creation.170  Courts may or may 
not reject that argument in favor of a Roommates.com approach.  Either 
outcome begs the question of why an online service provider’s direct liability 
for discriminatory ad targeting should turn on whether the claim treats the 
provider as the publisher of another party’s information content. 
CDA 230 likely immunizes ad-targeting platforms from the FHA’s 
effectively secondary “failure to correct” liability.  Whether this particular 
form of notice-based liability would impose excessive costs on a smart ad-
targeting service is a debatable matter of housing discrimination policy.  
Whether the targeting platform fits CDA 230’s information content provider 
definition seems completely irrelevant to that policy question. 
The problem illustrated here is that, even though it seems sensible to 
characterize ad targeting as a publisher activity, allegations of discriminatory 
ad targeting have nothing to do with content development.  CDA 230 was 
simply not designed or intended to handle situations in which a service 
provider’s activities as a publisher are actionable but the published content is 
not. 
2.  CDA 230’s All-or-Nothing Approach to Secondary Liability 
Like defamation doctrine, CDA 230 sets up an all-or-nothing choice 
between “monitor and control” liability and complete immunity.  Courts have 
struggled to find more nuanced ways to apply CDA 230 to today’s 
increasingly smart online service providers, but it is a difficult struggle 
because the definition of “information content provider” is essentially the 
only available statutory hook. 
a.  Shoehorning in Contributory Liability 
Roommates.com essentially shoehorned a contributory liability approach 
into the information content provider definition.171  The case interpreted 
“responsibility” for developing online information in terms of whether the 
website’s design “materially contributed” to its users’ discriminatory 
advertising or was a “neutral tool.”172  This test is, of course, familiar from 
contributory liability. 
While contributory liability may often be a good approach to online service 
provider liability, CDA 230’s “information content provider” definition is an 
awkward place to insert it.  The awkwardness derives not only from the fact 
that the definition focuses on content but also from its statutory role in 
defining when defendants are directly liable.  Contributory liability standards 
 
 170. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 24–25. 
 171. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 172. Id. 
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tend to be different from the underlying direct liability standards precisely 
because the defendant’s liability is derivative.  A contributory liability 
analysis is thus a muddled way to decide whether to immunize a defendant 
from direct liability. 
Moreover, the externality-based rationale for immunizing general-purpose 
services (“neutral tools”) from contributory liability does not apply to direct 
liability stemming from actionable use of such tools.  For direct liability 
based on an online service’s design, however, it makes sense to provide 
immunity for general-purpose services that could not reasonably be 
redesigned to avoid direct liability without sacrificing substantial legitimate 
uses. 
The ad-targeting case study is again illustrative.  The FHA imposes direct 
liability when a defendant’s own conduct results in a discriminatory housing 
practice, as evaluated under the applicable standards.  Those standards 
incorporate their own, quite rigorous, tests for distinguishing legitimate 
activities from actionable discrimination.  Those tests may not align with a 
“neutral tool” exemption.  For example, proffering a “legitimate reason” for 
disparate impact requires more than mere neutrality.  Facebook argues that 
its attribute-based targeting tool is “neutral” because it offers the same 
attributes to all potential advertisers.173  Such neutrality need not imply that 
an ad-targeting service has a legitimate reason for offering protected 
attributes to housing advertisers.  It may simply mean that the service’s 
designers did not bother to account for antidiscrimination laws.  Immunizing 
an ad-targeting service from FHA liability simply because it is “neutral” 
seems perverse, particularly if the design could have accounted for 
antidiscrimination laws while maintaining the service’s viability for other 
sorts of advertisers.  The earlier discussion, along with the consent decree, 
suggests that this was the case for Facebook. 
b.  Putting Inducement Back on the Table 
Courts have considered inducement-like arguments against CDA 230 
immunity but mostly have not been persuaded by them.174  This is probably 
the right result under the current statute, despite the fact that the wrongs 
alleged in some cases clearly arise from the service provider’s inducement of 
actionable conduct by its users.  Inducement liability is not appropriate in all 
arenas because it can induce some overcompliance, but that is no reason to 
insist on CDA 230’s all-or-nothing Hobson’s choice.  How worried do we 
really need to be about overdeterring service providers from bellying right 
up to the line of actively inducing housing discrimination or fraud or child 
sex trafficking?  Within the strictures of the First Amendment, those trade-
offs are matters for political debate.  By enacting FOSTA, which creates 
inducement liability, Congress answered that question for prostitution and 
 
 173. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 27, 30. 
 174. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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sex trafficking.  FOSTA is controversial,175 but that makes our point.  The 
adoption of inducement liability in particular substantive arenas should be on 
the table for debate. 
c.  Institutional Competence 
Many substantive liability regimes incorporate secondary liability 
standards (whether or not so-named) that are much more nuanced than CDA 
230’s all-or-nothing approach.  Regardless of whether one agrees with the 
results, those regimes presumably reflect balances worked out in light of 
policy concerns salient in those arenas.  CDA 230 runs roughshod over those 
balances whenever online service providers are involved.  It is still true that 
balances struck for offline secondary liability may be upset online and also 
that externality concerns may be more urgent simply because general-
purpose services may be more common.  Nonetheless, today’s online 
services are sufficiently various that it is no longer plausible, particularly 
given the rise of smart services, that CDA 230’s all-or-nothing balance is 
appropriate for all of them. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, we offer a proposal for reform of CDA 230 based on the 
above analysis. 
1) Definition of “treated as a publisher.”  CDA 230 should be amended 
to clarify that a party is not “treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider” unless 
liability is premised primarily on the actionable nature of that third-party 
content.  This change preserves the sort of immunity from publisher liability 
that the drafters of CDA 230 had in mind.176  We also recommend that the 
phrase “publisher or speaker” be modified to “publisher or distributor,” 
adopting current judicial interpretation. 
2) Limited immunity for services capable of substantial nonactionable 
uses.  The previous amendment would clarify that online service providers 
are generally liable for direct and secondary claims not primarily premised 
on actionable third-party content.  It is generally appropriate to defer to the 
substantive policy trade-offs made by legislators and relevant agencies.  We 
see no justification, particularly in an era of smart services, for a blanket 
assumption that conforming to substantive legal constraints will always be 
unduly burdensome for online service providers. 
We recognize, however, that some substantive laws and regulations on the 
books will not adequately account for the potential external social costs of 
holding providers of general-purpose online services liable.  We therefore 
 
 175. See, e.g., Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA:  A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2188–89 (2019) (“Opponents contend that FOSTA could reach any 
UISP shown to have hosted actionable material related to sex trafficking even if the UISP had 
neither knowledge of the content nor the intent to assist sex traffickers.”). 
 176. See supra Part I.A. 
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propose adding a provision to CDA 230 conferring immunity on providers 
of online services capable of substantial nonactionable uses when two 
conditions are satisfied:  (1) liability is based on the design of the service; 
and (2) the service cannot reasonably be designed to avoid liability while 
retaining substantial nonactionable uses.  The second condition reflects the 
fact that software-based services can often be relatively cheaply and easily 
customized for different applications.  It is also good policy to incentivize 
service providers to incorporate such reasonable measures into their designs.  
We would apply the proposed limited immunity to both direct and secondary 
liability. 
The Roommates.com and ad-targeting cases can be used to illustrate how 
this proposal would work in practice.  Roommates.com’s design may or may 
not have had substantial nonactionable uses but, in any event, could easily 
have been modified to avoid liability under the FHA simply by removing 
protected characteristics.177  The designers were at best reckless with regard 
to the site’s potential to promote housing discrimination and there seems to 
be no normative justification for immunizing them from liability for their 
design.  While the Ninth Circuit arrived at the right result, our proposal would 
provide a much cleaner path to that outcome. 
Facebook’s ad platform is certainly capable of substantial nonactionable 
uses, but reasonable design changes along the lines of those in the consent 
decree would likely have enabled Facebook to reduce its potential liability 
for discriminatory ad targeting without impacting the platform’s 
nonactionable uses. 
3) Immunity from secondary liability not based on publishing actionable 
third-party content.178  We do not propose complete immunity from all 
substantive secondary liability provisions.  Especially in the era of smart 
services, online service providers may have the capacity to cope with many 
secondary liability regimes, even if they take “monitor and control” or notice-
based approaches.  Deference to the policy trade-offs enshrined in 
substantive secondary liability regimes is generally appropriate, but many 
laws on the books may not have considered how the online environment 
might affect those policies.  We therefore propose modifying CDA 230 as 
follows: 
a) Secondary liability provisions based on a defendant’s contribution to, 
facilitation of, or failure to monitor actionable user behavior would be 
preempted and replaced by a contributory liability regime that combines a 
“material contribution” requirement with a “knew or should have known” 
mental state, unless and until regulators redesigned or reaffirmed them for 
online services.  This default contributory liability regime would, for 
example, replace substantive “monitor and control” regimes such as the 
FHA’s “failure to correct” provisions that had not been redesigned or 
reaffirmed. 
 
 177. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 178. This provision applies even if it is framed as “direct liability,” such as the liability for 
“failure to correct” under 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(ii)–(iii). 
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b) Online service providers would be immune from substantive 
inducement liability regimes, unless and until regulators redesigned or 
reaffirmed their applicability.  While our proposal puts inducement 
liability back on the table, we do not think inducement liability is an 
appropriate default, given the First Amendment and collateral censorship 
concerns. 
c) These rules would apply to both federal and state statutes and 
regulations. 
As an example, an ad-targeting platform would be immune from liability 
under the FHA’s current “failure to correct” provisions because they are not 
specifically applicable to online service providers.  The service provider 
would nonetheless be liable under the default contributory liability regime if 
it knew or should have known that its ad-targeting platform materially 
contributes to discriminatory ad targeting.  In the future, HUD could use 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to specifically extend the “failure to 
correct” regime to online service providers.  Moreover, our proposed version 
of CDA 230 would not immunize online service providers from liability if 
Congress were to, if it so desired, add a provision to the FHA providing 
liability for actively inducing discriminatory uses of automated ad-targeting 
tools. 
